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This study investigated the link between expertise for a prototype-
defined category and the face inversion effect (which refers to the 
decline in performance in recognising faces that are inverted 
compared to the recognition of faces in their normal upright 
orientation; e.g., Yin, 1969). We aimed to demonstrate an 
analogous effect in chequerboards drawn from a familiar category 
such that participants  had acquired a certain expertise with that 
category. Participants in this study were first presented with a 
categorisation task in which they were asked to sort a number of 
chequerboards (in an upright orientation) into two categories. This 
increased their familiarity with these categories. Then, in the next 
(study) phase, participants were presented with a set of 
chequerboards which included  exemplars (some upright, some 
inverted) from one of the two categories that  participants were 
familiar with, plus exemplars (also upright or inverted) from a 
novel category.  Following this, participants were presented with 
an old/new recognition task that included exemplars seen in the 
study phase plus new exemplars of the same (familiar and novel) 
categories in both orientations (upright and inverted). We 
succeeded in obtaining the same pattern of effects reported in 
McLaren (1997), i.e. a significant inversion effect for stimuli 
drawn from the familiar category, but with standard recognition 
procedures. We interpret the results in terms of McLaren and 
Mackintosh's (2000) theory of representation development. 
Keywords:Inversion; perceptual learning; expertise; faces; 
recognition; chequerboards; categorization; latent inhibition. 
Introduction 
The face inversion effect proper refers to the greater 
decline in performance in recognizing faces that are inverted 
compared to the recognition of faces in their normal upright 
orientation when contrasted with similar manipulations 
using other stimuli such as pictures of houses (Yin, 1969).  
On the basis of this effect it had been believed that faces 
were processed in our brain in a different way to other kinds 
of stimuli. The assumption that facial stimuli are special can 
be challenged by the demonstration that the inversion effect 
in recognition memory can be as strong with images of dogs 
as with faces when the subjects are experts in specific dog 
breeds (Diamond & Carey, 1986). Thus, this suggests that 
the face inversion effect may not be due to the fact that 
facial stimuli are separately processed by the brain, but 
instead that there are other factors, such as expertise,  which 
give rise to this effect. Back in 1997 McLaren demonstrated 
that we can  obtain a significant inversion effect analogous 
to that in faces with chequerboards drawn from a familiar 
category as long as they possess the appropriate stimulus 
structure. Subjects were exposed to a set of chequerboards 
and were asked to categorise them into two different  
prototype-defined categories. This was followed by a 
discrimination task which included two pairs of 
chequerboards (one pair in an upright and the other pair in 
an inverted orientation) from a familiar category, plus two 
control pairs of chequerboards from a novel category (again 
one pair upright the other inverted). The results showed that 
familiarity with a category defined by a prototype gave 
subjects an enhanced ability to discriminate between 
exemplars of that category in an upright orientation. This 
benefit was lost when the stimuli were inverted, to the 
extent that learning of the discrimination involving inverted 
familiar exemplars was worse than for appropriate controls. 
No inversion effect was found for exemplars taken from a 
novel category of chequerboards, or for chequerboards that 
were taken from a familiar category that was not prototype-
based. In the same study McLaren (1997) tried to extend 
those results in a delayed matching task. Each trial of the 
delayed matching task involved a category exemplar being 
presented for 1 sec in either an upright or inverted 
orientation, and finally a second exemplar drawn from the 
same category and with the same orientation as the first. 
Subjects had to decide whether the second chequerboard 
was the same as or different from the first as rapidly as 
possible by pressing one of two keys. Trials were 
randomized with the constraint that half were positive 
(same) trials and half negative (different). Results showed 
that subjects presented with exemplars from a familiar 
category were significantly better at judging whether upright 
exemplars were the same or different than at making the 
same decision for the inverted exemplars. Finally 
performance on the familiar upright exemplars was 
significantly better than that for novel controls. Thus, 
experience with a category leads to a significant inversion 
effect in a matching task confirming the results obtained in 
the discrimination task. However this time   performance on 
inverted familiar exemplars was not significantly worse than 
that on inverted novel exemplars. In the present study we 
aimed to replicate McLaren’s (1997) findings using a 
standard face recognition paradigm, but with chequerboards 
as stimuli rather than faces. The prediction was that 
expertise with members of a familiar, prototype-defined 
category would lead to an improved ability in distinguishing 
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and recognising these members; an improvement that would 
be lost on inversion. Finally, as McLaren (1997) showed 
that inversion of familiar exemplars may incur some cost in 
discriminating those exemplars, we investigated whether 




Experiment 1a aimed to find a significant inversion effect in 
an artificial prototype-defined category that participants 
became familiar with during the experiment. 
Materials 
The stimuli were 16 x 16 chequerboards containing roughly 
half black and half white squares. Four prototypes were 
generated at random but with the constraint that they shared 
50% of their squares with any of the other prototypes. 
Exemplars were generated from these prototypes by 
changing squares at random as described in Figure 1. 
 
                
                          A                                    B 
 
                 
                       C                                    D 
 
Figure 1: The prototypes for categories A, B, C and D. On 
average, 48 of the squares were set at random to generate 
each exemplar, thus, on average, 24 squares would be 
expected to alter from black to white or white to black. 
There was no special relationship between exemplars 
generated from each prototype. 
 
Participants 
32 psychology undergraduates at the University of Exeter 
took part in the experiment. The study was counterbalanced 
by splitting participants into 8 groups. 
Procedure 
The study consisted of a ‘categorisation phase’ a ‘study 
phase’ and an old/new recognition ‘test phase’. In the 
categorisation phase, the subjects were instructed that once 
they pressed any key on the keyboard, a set of chequerboard 
stimuli would appear on the screen, one at a time in random 
order. Their task was to sort these stimuli into two 
categories by pressing one of the two keys (“x” or “.”), and 
they would get immediate feedback as to whether their 
response was correct or not. If they did not respond within 
4seconds, they would be timed out. The set of chequerboard 
stimuli included 128 exemplars of two different categories, 
with 64 in each category. Subjects were encouraged to scan 
the whole of each chequerboard before categorising it. In 
order to counterbalance our stimuli, we used 8 participant 
groups. The first 4 of those were presented, during the 
categorisation task, with 64 exemplars drawn from category 
A and 64 exemplars drawn from category B. The second 4 
were presented with 64 exemplars drawn from each of the C 
and D categories. After the categorisation phase was 
concluded participants proceeded to the study phase. For 
each subject, the task was to look at a number of new 
exemplars from one of the two familiar categories seen in 
the categorisation task, plus an equal number of novel 
exemplars from a category not previously seen. Thus, for 
example, participant group 1 was presented with a set of 
stimuli that included 32 exemplars (16 upright and 16 
inverted) drawn from category A (familiar) and 32 
exemplars (16 in both orientations) drawn from category C 
which was novel for them. To counterbalance this 
participant group 5 was presented with 32 exemplars (16 
upright and 16 inverted) drawn from category C (familiar) 
and 32 exemplars (16 in both orientations) drawn from 
category A which was novel for that group. Thus, in the 
study phase each participant was shown 4 types of exemplar 
each containing 16 stimuli giving a total of 64 exemplars. 
These were presented one at a time in a random order for 3 
seconds. The exemplar types were: 1-Familiar Inverted 
exemplars (1FI); 2-Familiar Upright exemplars (1FU); 3- 
Novel Inverted exemplars(1NI) and 4-Novel Upright 
exemplars (1NU). Following the study phase subjects were 
given an old/new recognition task. This involved the 64 
exemplars seen in the study phase (32 in an upright and 32 
in an inverted orientation, as presented in the study phase), 
plus 64 new exemplars (32 in an upright and 32 in an 
inverted orientation) split across the same four exemplar 
types shown in the study phase. The unstudied exemplar 
types were: 5-Familiar Inverted exemplars (2FI); 6-Familiar 
Upright exemplars (2FU); 7- Novel Inverted 
exemplars(2NI) and 8-Novel Upright exemplars (2NU). 
Each exemplar had a unique identifying number, to make 
sure that an individual exemplar never appeared in more 
than one condition at a time during the experiment. To 
simplify their use in the experiment, the stimuli available 
were divided into sets of 16 giving 8 sets of stimuli, and 
each participant group was shown a different combination 
of the 8 sets as shown in Table 1 below. Subjects in the test 
phase were asked to press  “.”  on the computer keyboard  if 
they had seen the chequerboard before in the study phase, or 
“x” if they had not seen it and had 4 seconds in which to do 
so. Data was collected on accuracy and latency in 
recognition performance across the test recognition phase.  
At the end of the study subjects were debriefed about the 




Table 1: Combinations of the stimuli presented to each 
participant group.  Exemplars used in the study phase and 
the test phase were numbers 64 to128. The first 4 stimulus 
groups were the ones seen both in the study phase and in the 
test. The latter 4 were seen only during the test phase. 
 
Results 
The data from all 32 subjects was used for the signal 
detection analysis. In the categorization phase, the mean 
percentage correct was 64%. Figure 2 gives the results from 
the test phase for the signal detection measure d' by 
category type. Following McLaren (1997) we expected an 
inversion effect (higher score for upright than for inverted) 
for the familiar category, no inversion effect for the novel 
category, and a significant difference between the effects of 
inversion for familiar and novel categories. Planned 
contrasts were used to examine whether these effects were 
reliable. As expected, a significant difference in d' was 
found for the upright versus inverted familiar category 
exemplars, F(1,31)=3.59, p<.05 one-tail. No significant 
inversion effect was found for novel category exemplars, 
F(1,31)=-1.16, p=ns.  
 
 
Figure 2: the X axis gives the four different stimulus 
conditions, whereas the Y axis shows the mean d' for the 
old/new recognition phase in Experiment 1a. 
There was also a significant interaction between category 
type and orientation, F(1,31)=3.63, p<.05 one-tail. The 
effect of category type and orientation on recognition was 
also analyzed by means of planned comparisons on d’ 
scores. Familiar upright exemplars were not recognized 
significantly better than unfamiliar upright exemplars, 
F(1,31)=2.07, p=.08, though there was a clear trend in that 
direction. There was also a non-significant trend for familiar 
inverted exemplars to be worse than novel ones, 
F(1,31)=0.92, p= .17.  
 
Discussion 
We have replicated the original effect with chequerboards, 
but this time using exactly the same recognition paradigm as 
is normally used for  face recognition studies. There is a 
significant inversion effect for the familiar category of 
chequerboards, but no inversion effect for novel 
chequerboards. An explanation consistent with the results 
obtained in Experiment 1a is that stimulus pre-exposure 
leads to perceptual learning. The familiar chequerboards 
benefit from this and, hence, subjects are better able to 
recognize upright exemplars of that category. But an 
individual’s performance declines when presented with 
exemplars of that ostensibly familiar category in an inverted 
orientation because they are not actually familiar with the 
stimuli in that orientation (McLaren, Kaye and Mackintosh, 
1989; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000). This leads to the 
inversion effect observed with the familiar category, but this 
effect is not seen for the novel chequerboards as here there 
is no perceptual learning to be lost on inversion. One issue 
for this account of Experiment 1a's results, however, is that 
the mechanism described predicts such an effect only for 
categories defined in terms of a prototype, but we have no 
direct evidence for this in these experiments as yet.  
 
Experiment 1b 
In Experiment 1b we addressed this issue. The same 
procedure was used again but this time there was an 
alteration in the method used to generate the stimuli. We 
used a variant on the procedure for generating ‘shuffled’ 
stimuli outlined in McLaren (1997), as this produced stimuli 
that were as easy to classify as prototype-defined stimuli, 
but they did not average to the base pattern used to generate 
them and so did not, as a class, possess a prototype 
themselves. Exemplars were constructed by shuffling rows, 
a random permutation of 3 randomly chosen horizontal rows 
of a base pattern (we used the base patterns from 
Experiment 1a) constituting an exemplar of that category.  
We only shuffled three rows, to keep the number of squares 
that (on average) changed the same as in Experiment 1a 
(this was far fewer than the number shuffled in 1997). The 
procedure was that two rows were identified at random and 
swapped, then a new row was identified, and swapped with 
one of the previous two. The result is that, on average, half 
the squares in each of the three rows will be altered making 
24 in all. Thus, this experiment is, in some sense the control 
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for Experiment 1a, though as will become apparent, the ease 
of classification produced by using these materials more 
nearly matched that of Experiment 2. We predicted no 
inversion effect for either familiar or novel category 
exemplars in this experiment. 
 
Participants 
32 psychology undergraduates at the University of Exeter 
took part in the experiment. The study was counterbalanced, 




The data from all 32 subjects was, as for Experiments1a,  
used for the analysis.. In the categorisation phase, the mean 
percentage correct was 77%. Thus, as we predicted the 
stimuli were at least as easy to categorize as stimuli in 
Experiment 1a. However as Figure 3 suggests there was no 
significant difference in d-prime means for familiar category 
exemplars or for novel category exemplars, confirming our 
predictions. The crucial interaction, however, is not that 
within Experiment 1b, but emerges when we compare the 
results of Experiment 1b with those of Experiment 1a. In 
McLaren (1997) a similar comparison showed that the 
inversion effect, defined as the familiarity by orientation 
interaction, obtained with exemplars drawn from a 
prototype-defined category was significantly greater than 
that obtained with exemplars drawn from a category that 
was not defined by a prototype. If we compute the 
Experiment by Familiarity by Orientation interaction for 
Experiments 1a and 1b we find F(1,31)=5.15, p=.013 (one-
tail), confirming that this is the case here. Thus we have the 
necessary evidence to state that the inversion effect depends 




Figure 3: The X axis shows the four different stimulus 
conditions, whereas the Y axis shows the average number of 
accurate responses (out of 32) for each of the four 





Experiment 1b supported our explanation of the inversion 
effect, in particular that the inversion effect would only arise 
for a category of stimuli based on a prototype. Being able to 
categorize stimuli that were not defined by a prototype did 
not give the subjects any advantage in recognising 
exemplars of that category in their upright orientation, and 
did not produce any of the effects observed in Experiment 
1a. However, our inversion effect in Experiment 1a is not as 
substantial as we would like. This may be because 
participants found it too hard to recognize the 
chequerboards. Experiment 2 aimed to address this issue.  
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1a but this 
time we tried to make the chequerboards more “clumpy”, 
with the intention of making the stimuli easier to recognize. 
We hoped to obtain a stronger inversion effect for familiar 
chequerboards than the one obtained in Experiment 1a. 
 
Materials 
In this experiment a randomly chosen 96 squares (up from 
48 in Experiment 1a) were set at random to generate each 
exemplar, and the prototypes themselves had stronger 
differentiation into black and white areas (see Figure 4). 
 
 
                 
Prototype A                      Prototype A 
Experiment 1                    Experiment 2 
 
 
                 
Exemplar A65                 Exemplar A65 
Experiment 1                   Experiment 2 
 
Figure 4: The prototypes and example exemplars for 




32 psychology undergraduates at the University of Exeter 
took part in the experiment. The study was counterbalanced, 
as in Experiment 1, by splitting participants into 8 groups. 
 
Procedure 




The data from all 32 subjects was used for the analysis. In 
the categorisation phase, the mean percentage correct was 
77%, indicating that our manipulation of the stimuli had 
made them easier to classify at least. Figure 5 gives the 
results for the mean d' score by category type.  Planned 
comparisons were used to examine whether  or not there 
was a significant inversion effect for  familiar category 
exemplars. A reliable difference in d' emerged for the 
upright versus the inverted familiar category exemplars, 
F(1,31)=8.09, p<.01 one-tail. There was also a significant 
interaction between category type and orientation, 
F(1,31)=4.12, p<.03 one-tail. To explore this further the 
effect of category type on the recognition of upright 
exemplars was also analyzed. Familiar upright exemplars 
were not recognized significantly better than unfamiliar 
upright exemplars, F(1,31)=.96, p=.17, but novel inverted 
exemplars were recognized significantly better than familiar 





Figure 5:The X axis shows the four different stimulus’ 
conditions, whereas the Y axis shows the mean 
discrimination in d-prime (out of 32) for the old/new 
recognition phase in Experiment 2. 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 replicated and strengthened the findings 
obtained in Experiment 1a.We were able to increase the 
inversion effect for chequerboards by making them easier to 
recognize. Thus, our results confirm that an inversion effect 
can be induced by familiarizing participants with a category. 
We are now also able to comment further on the basis for 
this effect. The trend for familiar upright exemplars to be 
better recognized than novel upright exemplars was not 
itself significant (though the effect was numerically in the 
right direction), but this time inverted familiar exemplars 
were significantly worse recognized than novel inverted 
exemplars. This replicates the finding in McLaren (1997), 
and indicates that the inversion effect may be as much to do 
with a disadvantage for inverted familiar exemplars as it is 
with an advantage for upright familiar exemplars. We return 
to this point in the General Discussion. 
 
General Discussion 
Experiments 1a, 1b and 2 support the hypothesis that 
expertise with a category defined by a prototype leads to an 
inversion effect in standard recognition paradigms with 
stimuli drawn from that category, and this does not happen 
after experience with a category that cannot be defined in 
terms of a prototype. Before accepting this assertion, 
however, we must establish that the pattern of performance 
seen in Experiment 1b was not simply a floor effect when 
compared to Experiment 1a. In fact, the data argue against 
this interpretation. Performance overall in Experiment 1a 
was only marginally better than chance  F(1,31)=2.64, 
p=.057, confirming that our participants found the task very 
difficult. Overall performance in Experiment 1b was 
significantly above chance, F(1,31)=8.00, p<.005, however, 
so if anything the task with the shuffled chequerboards was 
easier, as the categorization results also suggest. It is 
unlikely, therefore, that the lack of an inversion effect with 
the shuffled chequerboards is due to a floor effect. 
There is one aspect of the stimulus construction used this 
time in the case of the shuffled chequerboards that does 
require further discussion. In the McLaren (1997) 
experiments, the rows were shuffled a great deal, and as 
such the likelihood of any given row remaining in its base 
position was rather low. This meant that the average of all 
the shuffled patterns was a set of vertical bands of varying 
degrees of grey (depending on the proportion of black 
squares in any given column), and this average was not 
actually a chequerboard, and so could not be considered as a 
prototype of the category.  In these experiments we only 
shuffle three rows, to equate the number of squares changed 
(on average) in Experiments 1 a and 1b, and this means that 
the chance of a row not being changed from its base position 
is rather high. Given this, the average of all the shuffled 
exemplars will now approximate a (slightly blurry) 
chequerboard, and the claim that this is no longer a 
prototype-defined category is harder to sustain. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that our procedures with 
these stimuli lead to a quite different set of results to those 
obtained with the standard prototype + noise stimuli used in 
Experiments 1a and 2. A more detailed application of  the 
MKM (McLaren, Kaye and Mackintosh, 1989; further 
developed in McLaren and Mackintosh, 2000) model to 
these stimuli helps make it clear why this should be so. 
Take the  stimuli of Experiments 1a and 2 first. Starting 
with a base pattern (the prototype), 48 squares are randomly 
chosen and then set to black or white at random to create 
each exemplar that will, on average, differ by 24 squares 
from the prototype. Consider a typical changed square in the 
middle of the stimulus. It will be surrounded by 8 squares 
that will mostly be those of the base pattern (on average 
0.75 of a square of these 8 will have changed). As a 
consequence of category pre-exposure, the MKM model 
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tells us that the elements of a stimulus associate to one 
another, and that this allows them to predict one another, 
reduce their error scores, and as a consequence their 
salience decreases. But, for a changed  square the 
predictions from the surrounding elements (which as near 
neighbours will be important predictors of this square) will 
be wrong, and so the square will have a very high salience 
because of it's very high error score. This facilitates 
discrimination and recognition based on these changed 
features (which define the exemplars). In the case of the 
shuffled stimuli in Experiment 1b, because a row is moved 
as a whole, the squares either side of a changed square will 
be the same as usual for that square and are the best 
predictors of that square, even though its location in the 
stimulus has altered. The predictions of the other 
surrounding squares (on average 5.75 will be unchanged) 
will be less important. The essential difference captured by 
this analysis is that shuffling rows makes the squares in a 
row the best predictors of one another independent of where 
that row is in the stimulus, and this acts in opposition to any 
salience increase that would be gained from location 
specific prediction effects. Thus category pre-exposure will 
not be expected to be so beneficial in the shuffled case. 
 The basis of the inversion effect obtained with prototype-
defined categories seems to be in part due to some 
advantage for the upright exemplars from the familiar 
category. This was significant in McLaren (1997), and 
though not independently significant in the studies reported 
here, if we assess Experiments 1a and 2 in combination by 
deriving the Z-scores based on their probabilities (1.41 and 
0.96), summing them and dividing by 
! 
2  to get a final Z  
we have Z=1.67, p<.05. The explanation of an advantage for 
the upright exemplars drawn from the familiar category has 
already been given but bears some repetition. During 
categorization, the prototypical elements common to the 
exemplars of a given category will be routinely exposed, 
and so will lose salience according to the MKM model 
(McLaren and Mackintosh, 2000). By way of contrast, the 
elements unique to each exemplar (which the subjects will 
have less exposure to), will still have relatively high 
salience. Hence, the structure of this prototype-defined 
category will ensure that differential latent inhibition of 
common and unique elements can happen. This differential 
latent inhibition as a consequence of categorization leads to 
perceptual learning, which leads to an improved ability to 
recognize upright exemplars of the familiar category 
because this depends on using the unique elements of 
exemplars rather than the ones they share in common. This 
advantage would be lost on inversion because subjects are 
not familiar with those exemplars in an inverted orientation, 
and hence the unique elements of an exemplar would no 
longer enjoy a salience advantage over the elements 
common to most exemplars and the prototype. On the other 
hand, when subjects are presented with exemplars of a novel 
category that they have not been pre-exposed to, no 
mechanisms for latent inhibition and hence perceptual 
learning can apply (at least not straight away) so there will 
not be any benefit in recognizing exemplars of that novel 
category in their upright orientation. Thus, no significant 
inversion effect would be expected, because an inverted 
novel chequerboard is just another novel chequerboard.  
This leaves us with the evidence that we now have from two 
studies that familiarity with a prototype-defined category 
will lead to inverted members of that category being less 
easily discriminated (McLaren, 1997) or recognized 
(Experiment 2 of this paper) than novel controls. The 
implications of this finding are far-reaching, because they 
suggest that inversion effects, including those with faces, 
could depend on a disadvantage for familiar inverted stimuli 
as much as on an advantage for familiar upright stimuli. In 
fact, it is only experiments of the type reported here which 
can reveal this possibility, as the baseline for standard face 
inversion experiments is hard to establish. McLaren (1997) 
speculates on the possible basis of such a component to the 
inversion effect if it were to be established that such a 
component exists. We believe that we have now succeeded 
in demonstrating that this effect is real, but the explanation 
of the disadvantage brought about by inversion will have to 
wait for further research.  
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